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Abstract 
 
The increasing concern of the policy maker about eating behavior has focused on the 
spread of obesity and on the evidence of a consistent number of individuals dieting 
despite being underweight. As the latter behavior is often attributed to the social 
pressure to be thin, some governments have already taken actions to ban ultra-thin 
ideals and testimonials.  Assuming that people are heterogeneous in their healthy 
weights, but are exposed to the same ideal body weight, this paper proposes a 
theoretical framework to assess whether increasing the ideal body weight is socially 
desirable, both from a welfare and from a health point of view. If being overweight 
is the average condition and the ideal body weight is thin, increasing the ideal body 
weight may increase welfare by reducing social pressure. By contrast, health is on 
average reduced, since people depart even further from their healthy weight. Given 
that in the US and in Europe people are on average overweight, we conclude that 
these policies, even when are welfare improving, may foster the obesity epidemic. 
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1 Introduction
The governments of Italy, Germany and Spain have recently signed agreements with the fashion
business associations to set in detail some aspects of the industry productive decisions, commu-
nication strategies, and labelling of products. The agreements favour, for example, increases in
the production of large-sized clothes, in the minimum size of models on the catwalks, and of
mannequins in the shops; or they forbid the denomination "fat size" for size 46. The explicit goal
of these policies is to reduce unhealthy eating behavior among young people, in particular young
women, by a¤ecting the ideal of beauty that the media and the fashion industry disseminate1.
This paper proposes a theoretical framework to assess whether increasing the ideal body weight
is socially desirable, both from a welfare and from a health point of view.
Given the paramount relevance of Europe in the international fashion market, these agree-
ments can have important world-wide consequences on the fashion industry, a global business
that in the U.S. has a turnover in excess of $200 billion2. Another consequence, on which we
focus in this paper, is the e¤ect that these policies may have on peoples eating behavior, health
and welfare. When reading the content of the agreements, it is clear that both the government
and the fashion industry agree that fashion is a powerful trend-setter. It not only inuences
what clothes, styles and colors are trendy, but also denes how a person should appear to be
desirable. This includes body shape and body weight. People often recognize that being attrac-
tive according to the yardsticks set by the media and the fashion industry is out of reach. It is
also true that not everybody judges herself or himself according to these ideal body shapes and
weights. There is however evidence that plain-looking people tend to nd worse jobs and receive
lower wages (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994) and, with reference to body weight, that being over-
weight determines multiple forms of prejudice and discrimination (Cawley, 2004; Morris, 2006;
Puhl and Heuer, 2009). In other words, there is evidence that those not conforming to the ideal
body weight, are stigmatized and socially sanctioned (Strahan et al., 2006).
In this paper we formalize these arguments considering how a given ideal body weight a¤ects
eating behavior, and consequently body weight and health. We propose a dynamic model of
individual eating behavior where a forward looking agent chooses how much food to consume.
Utility depends on food consumption and on body weight, the latter being endogenously deter-
mined by the di¤erence between calories intake and expenditure. If the agents body weight is
either higher or lower than her healthy weight, the agent su¤ers a reduction in her health. The
agent also su¤ers a disutility cost when her body weight does not conform to an ideal weight
1Along the same reasoning, in 2008 France approved a law that makes the promotion of extreme forms of
slenderness a criminal o¤ense.
2The apparel industrys annual sales in the U.S. are more than the sum of the sales of books, movies and
music. In New York, one of the fashion capitals, the fashion industry is the third-employer, the rst two being
nance and health-care; see Hemphill and Suk (2009), Raustiala and Sprigman (2009).
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that is exogenously determined by the society, and that cannot be inuenced by the agent. Since
the healthy weight and the ideal weight usually do not coincide, agents have to trade-o¤ the
health and social consequences of their food intake. This results in a variety of eating behaviors,
including the possibility of optimally choosing to be on diet despite being underweight.
Under the assumption that the mentioned policies are e¤ective in increasing the ideal body
weight, we provide a normative assessment of their desirability, both in terms of aggregate utility
and aggregate health. The distinction is relevant because a welfare-maximizing policy does not
coincide with a health-maximizing one. Assuming that people are heterogeneous in their healthy
weights, but are exposed to the same ideal body weight, we show that increasing the ideal
body weight induces people to increase their food intake and their body weight. If people are
underweight and stay on a diet, increasing the ideal body weight allows both aggregate welfare
and health to be improved. If people are overweight and on a diet, however, increasing the
ideal body weight can improve overall utility, but it worsens health because it induces people to
become even more overweight. A precise assessment of the relevant policy objective and of who
will be inuenced by the policy is therefore critical for determining the desirability of an increase
in the ideal body weight. Given that in the US and in Europe people are on average overweight,
these policies, even when are welfare improving, may thus foster the obesity epidemic.
Our approach is in line with Akerlof and Kranton (2000), who consider the fact that in-
dividuals belong to social categories, and that each category can be associated with di¤erent
ideal physical attributes and prescribed behaviors. The existence of these references generates
a pressure to conform to the ideal attribute or behavior, and deviations from them are so-
cially sanctioned3. Akerlof and Kranton observe that public policies sometimes are directed
at manipulating these references, and consequently individual behavior. A notable example is
the stigmatization of smokers and the restrictions on smoking advertising aimed at cutting the
consumption of tobacco, which have been e¤ective at reducing smoking in the population (Ak-
erlof and Kranton, 2000; Philipson and Posner, 2008). Analogously, in this paper we provide
a theoretical evaluation of the welfare and health e¤ects of policies aimed at a¤ecting the so-
cial desirability of body weight, with the goal of counteracting the "slimming mania" of young
people.
Our paper contributes to the sparse economic literature on eating behavior in three directions.
First, we extend the previous literature on the "obesity epidemics" (Philipson and Posner, 1999;
3Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduce the concept of social norm to study prescribed behaviors (i.e. peoples
views of how they, and others, should or should not behave), as well as prescribed attributes. According to
the second part of the denition, we could refer to the existence of social pressure on body weight as a socio-
cultural norm of appearence (as in Levy, 2002). There exist alternative denitions for social norms. For example,
Bicchieri (2006) denes a social norm in terms of social expectations, while Fehr and Gächter (2000) refer to it
as a behavioral regularity. Additionally, norms can be both externally and internally enforced by social pressure
and individual feelings of guilt, embarassment, and anxiety (Elster, 1989). We do not use the term social norm
to avoid confusion, and we refer to the social cost of not conforming to the ideal body weight.
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Levy, 2002; Yaniv, 2002; Dragone, 2009; Yaniv et al., 2009) by showing that being underweight
can be the rational outcome of a maximizing agent. Second, we show that a single model
with social pressure can produce a variety of empirically observed eating behaviors. Finally, we
contribute to the small body of papers that focus on policies aimed at a¤ecting eating behavior,
such as the discussion on the role of fat taxes and thin subsidies (Yaniv et al., 2009), the
implementation of educational programs (Acs and Lyles, 2007; Philipson and Posner, 2008),
and the enhancement of access to information (Downs et al., 2009; Wansink et al., 2009). To
the best of our knowledge, laws and agreements aimed at regulating eating behavior by a¤ecting
the ideal body weight have not been discussed before.
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section we will present in detail the
content of the existing agreements and the underlying rationale. In the third section we will
develop the model of individual food consumption and endogenous body weight. In the fourth
section we will study the impact of an increase in the ideal body weight on both welfare and
health, and we will discuss the implications of the existing policies. Finally, in the last section
we will provide conclusions and directions for future research.
2 "Together against slimming mania"
On 23 January 2006, the Italian Ministry for Youth and Sports Activities signed an agreement
with the fashion industry to prohibit the participation of anorexic models in the fashion shows,
to increase the production of clothes sized 46-48, and to avoid promoting slender ideals. After
one year, on 23 January 2007, the Spanish Ministry of Health and the Spanish fashion indus-
try and stylists associations signed a similar agreement where they establish that models and
mannequins should resemble the population biometrics. They set a minimum size for models
and mannequins, a minimum body mass index (BMI) for participants to beauty contests, and
they forbid the denomination "fat size" for clothes sized 46. France opted for a tougher remedy.
To counteract the proliferation of websites promoting anorexia as a lifestyle (the so-called "Pro-
Ana" movement), from 15 April 2008 those who explicitly promote extreme forms of slenderness
can be punished with a 30.000 Euro ne and two years prison4. After a few months, on 11 July
2008, the German Ministry of Health and the German textile and fashion industry also signed a
national charter. Signicantly titled "Life Carries Weight - Together against slimming mania",
the goal of the charter is "to initiate a process of reorientation among children, young people and
adults regarding prevailing beauty ideals" by promoting and propagating "a healthy body im-
4Anorexia nervosa is an eating disorder that can originate from multiple causes. Cultural factors, such as the
promotion of thinness as the ideal female form in Western industrialized nations, have been recognized as one of
the possible causes. People in professions where there is a particular social pressure to be thin (such as models
and dancers) were much more likely to develop anorexia nervosa during the course of their career (Garner and
Garnkel, 2009, among others).
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age" and "unequivocally reject[ing] the unhealthy ideal of extreme thinness particularly among
girls and women". It also sets a minimum BMI for fashion models and forbids the publication
of images or photos of extremely thin models. Finally, it proposes to promote a discussion at
European level aimed at writing a European Charter to channel the individual national e¤orts.
The above polices are based on the assumption that the fashion industry and the media
have a major role in disseminating references on the ideal body weight to achieve. This as-
sumption, that is clearly stated in the German Charter5, is corroborated by the psychological
and sociological literature (e.g. Garner et al., 1980, 2009; Fallon, 1990; Wolf, 1991; Kilbourne,
1994; Smolak, 1996; Swami, 2006, and Ahern et al., 2008). According to this literature, since
the 1960s in Western industrialized countries attractiveness has been represented by a thin, t
body shape for females and a lean, muscular physique for males. Whether these ideal body
weights inuence peoples eating behavior and whether the fashion industry is responsible for
peoples improper eating behavior has been a matter of debate. On one hand, some observe that
not everybody judges herself or himself according to the ideal weight proposed by the media,
especially if one sees them as unrealistic and unattainable. According to this perspective, the
fashion industry and the media should freely choose their marketing strategies and their testi-
monials, and no external intervention is needed.6 On the other hand, some underline that, even
if a person does not individually care about the prevalent ideal body weight, it can turn out
to be relevant if other people (say, a potential employer or partner) discriminate against those
who are overweight or underweight. Thus, while the fashion industry and the media make their
prot-maximizing choices, they also produce an externality: the social pressure to conform to a
given ideal body weight. From this perspective, the existence of a social pressure that sanctions
those who do not conform to the ideal body weight can a¤ect the optimal individual eating
behavior. More specically, the slender ideal is considered to induce improper eating behavior,
negative consequences on peoples health, and ultimately well-being, which has motivated the
governments of France, Italy, Germany and Spain and the national fashion associations to agree
on forbidding the promotion of ultra-thin women and increasing the ideal body weight.7
In the following section we include the latter argument in a model of individual eating
behavior. This allows us to study the e¤ect of social pressure to conform to an ideal, exogenous
5The German charter says "even if the number of super-thin models employed in Germany is far lower than
in other European countries, the [fashion] industry still exerts a tremendous inuence through the media".
6As an example, see the view point taken by Armstrong and Turner on The Times, Sept. 23, 2006. Explaining
why the slender ideal has been promoted by the fashion industry in the last 50 years is out the scope of this
paper. As economists, it is natural to think that the marketing choices we observe are driven by prot-maximizing
strategies. For what concerns the use of ultra-thin models, this seems to be the case as most designers clearly
state that clothes hang better on thin fashion models.
7Not all the governments and fashion industry associations have agreed on undertaking this kind of measure.
For example, since 2006 the British Fashion Council has decided not to ban very thin models from the London
Fashion Weeks. Interestingly, some British stylists independently decided to promote a healthier ideal of beauty.
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body weight on individual food intake and body weight, and to provide a guideline to evaluate
the above mentioned policies.
3 The model
Consider a scenario where the population of a given country is made up of distinct groups,
indexed by G 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg: In the proceeding we describe the assumptions on the individual
utility function of a generic agent i belonging to group G.
3.1 The individual utility function
The individual utility function of agent i belonging to group G depends on the amount of calories
she intakes through food consumption ci  0 and on her body weight wi > 08. We consider the
following utility function
Ui;G(ci; wi) = ci

cFi  
ci
2

  1
2
 
wi   wHi
2   
2
 
wi   wG
2
: (1)
The rst term represents utility from food consumption. The parameter cFi > 0 represents the
individual satiation point (where F stands for food) beyond which the marginal pleasure from
food is negative9. We say that the agent i is undereating (or equivalently on a diet) if she eats
less that her satiation level, and she is overeating when she overcomes it. The former case occurs
when ci < cFi and the latter when ci > c
F
i .
The last two terms represent the e¤ect of body weight on individual utility. We assume that
this occurs through two channels: health and social desirability.
The rst e¤ect refers to the health consequences of being either overweight or underweight.
According to the WHO guidelines (1995; 2000; 2004) this occurs when a persons body mass
index is higher than 25 or lower than 18.5, respectively. When the individual BMI is between
18.5 and 25, a person is considered to have a normal weight.10 Within this range of values we
assume that there exists for each agent i a BMI that maximizes the agents health condition,
and we denote the corresponding body weight as wHi > 0 (where H stands for healthy)
11. The
8 Instead of referring to body weight, one might refer to body mass index, which is a measure of body weight
normalized by the individuals height and is the most used diagnostic tool in the study of weight problems. More
precisely, the BMI is dened as the individuals body weight (expressed in kilograms) divided by her squared
height (expressed in m2), and it depends neither on age nor on sex. It is thus clear that, if the individual height
is constant, it is equivalent to referring to individual body weight or to BMI.
9Allowing for satiation seems to be a natural assumption as we are focusing on the consumption of food at the
individual level, and not on the consumption of a generic bundle of goods.
10A BMI higher than 25 indicates that the person is overweight, and when BMI 30 the person is obese. A
17 BMI< 18:5 indicates that the individual is mildly underweight, when 16:5 BMI< 17 that is moderately
underweight, and severely underweight when lower than 16.5.
11See Dwyer (1996) for a discussion on the denition of healthy weight.
6
health consequences of body weight are summarized by the disutility cost the agent su¤ers when
her body weight wi is di¤erent from her healthy weight wHi (for a similar assumption see Etilè,
2007; Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2005; Philipson and Posner, 2003).
The second e¤ect is related to the existence of a socially desirable body weight wG  0:12 We
assume that wG is exogenously determined and that all agents belonging to group G consider
wG to be the socially desirable body weight. Given that agents are heterogeneous, in general wG
does not coincide with the individual healthy weight. As in Levy (2002), the specication used
in (1) implies that having a body weight that is di¤erent from wG is costly for the agent, with
the parameter   0 measuring the relevance of this cost. We interpret this as the social cost
of not conforming to a given weight due to, for example, discrimination on the job or between
peers.
3.2 The determinants of individual body weight
Agent i can choose how much to consume. She knows that her body weight cannot be directly
chosen, but it is endogenously determined by the balance between caloric intake and expen-
diture.13 Research on human nutrition shows that the largest source of calories expenditure is
due to the functioning of organs and tissues, as measured by the basal metabolic rate (BMR).
The BMR is the energy expenditure when a person is at rest (Mi­ in et al., 1990). It is not
inuenced by the level of aerobic activities, and it largely depends on body weight, together
with other individual characteristics such as individual metabolism (Broeder et al., 1992; Smith
et al., 1997). As in Levy (2002) and Dragone (2009), we assume that body weight changes over
time according to the following law of motion:
_wi(t) = ci(t)  wi(t) (2)
where  > 0 is a positive parameter indicating the e¤ect of weight on burning calories (e.g.
metabolism), and wi(t) represents the energy expenditure due to the BMR.14
3.3 The individual problem
The goal of agent i belonging to group G is to choose the amount of food consumption that
maximizes her utility. Given an innite time-horizon and a discount rate  > 0; the agents
12The provocative sentence "A woman can never be too rich or too thin, attributed to Wallis Simpson, Duchess
of Windsor, corresponds to the case where the ideal body weight is zero:
13 If body weight could be chosen by an individual, then the determination of the individual body weight would
only depend on the individual preferences.
14One might also include in the analysis the choice of physical activity, which includes on-the-job and o¤-the-job
activity. Though it is a relevant source of calories expenditure, it turns out that it plays a minor role with respect
to the BMR. In the Appendix we show that extending the analysis to include physical exercise does not change
the qualitative properties of the solution.
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intertemporal problem can be formally written as follows
max
fci(t)g
Z 1
0
e t
"
ci (t)

cFi  
ci (t)
2

 
 
wi (t)  wHi
2
2
  
 
wi (t)  wG
2
2
#
dt (3)
subject to _wi(t) = ci(t)  wi(t) (4)
wi(0) = wi0: (5)
where wi0 is the individual body weight at time zero.
Before solving the dynamic problem, consider what would happen if the agent did not take
into account how food consumption a¤ects her body weight, i.e. if she ignored (4). In such a
case, it would always be optimal to consume up to satiation for all possible body weights, i.e.
agent i would choose ci(t) = cFi at all t: The optimal consumption of this agent does not change
over time, but her body weight clearly changes, according to (4), until the steady state weight
wi = c
F
i = is reached. The value w
F
i := c
F
i = is to be interpreted as the body weight that an
agent would reach if she always ate up to satiation, and it allows us to distinguish between two
possible cases. If wFi > w
H
i ; we say that the agent tends to be overweight, and we say that the
agent tends to be underweight otherwise.
When moving to the dynamic problem, it is clear that choosing to eat up to satiation in
general does not maximize the intertemporal discounted utility of the agent. This is apparent
from the following proposition, where we characterize the solution of the intertemporal problem
once the agent i takes into account all factors that inuence her utility, including the endogenous
consequences of her eating behavior for her body weight.
Let A = 1+  + ( + ); B =  +
q
4 (1 + ) + (2 + )2; wWi = w
H
i   (+)
 
wFi   wHi

and wCi = w
F
i +
1

 
wFi   wHi

; the following then applies.
Proposition 1 Given the intertemporal problem (3)-(5):
1. there exists a unique steady state level of food consumption and body weight
ci = 
wHi +  ( + )w
F
i + w
G
i
A
; (6)
wi =
wHi +  ( + )w
F
i + w
G
i
A
; (7)
2. the steady state has saddle point stability;
3. in steady state, the agent is underweight if wG > wWi and overeating results if w
G > wCi ;
4. along the optimal path leading to the steady state, food consumption is given by the following
decreasing function of body weight
ci =
B
2
ci +

   B
2

wi: (8)
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Proof. The current-value Hamiltonian function associated with the problem is (omitting the
time index and the individual index i)
H () = c

cF   c
2

 
 
w   wH
2
2
  
 
w   wG
2
2
+  (c  w) (9)
where  is the relevant costate variable. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions are:
@H
@c
= 0 , cF   c =   (10)
_ =   @H
@w
= (+ )+
 
w   wH+   w   wG (11)
_w = c  w (12)
with the relevant transversality condition being limt!1 e t(t)w(t) = 0. Di¤erentiating (10)
with respect to time and substituting (11)-(10), we can rewrite the above conditions as a linear
dynamic system that depends on consumption and weight, obtaining:
_c = (c  cF )( + ) + (1 + )w   wH   wG (13)
_w = c  w: (14)
The steady state results from _c = _w = 0. As the trace and the determinant of the 22 Jacobian
matrix
J =
"
 +  1 + 
1  
#
are, respectively, positive and negative, the steady state has saddle point stability. To check that
(8) the optimal trajectory leading to the steady state is indeed linear, take the ratio between
(13) and (14),
dc
dw
=
(c  cF )( + ) + (w   wH) + (w   wG)
c  w ; (15)
and substitute. As the slope of (8) is    B2 < 0; the optimal path of food consumption crosses
the locus _w = 0 from above, guaranteeing that (8) is indeed the stable saddle path. To verify the
conditions under which being overweight and overeating occurs take, respectively, the di¤erence
w   wHi and c   cFi , and rearrange.
Proposition 1 shows that a forward looking agent can do better than just eating up to
satiation. It is optimal to adapt the amount of food consumption to the current body weight
(see Eq. 8). More precisely, it is optimal to limit food consumption when body weight is high
and, conversely, to consume much (eventually beyond satiation) when body weight is too low.
When the food intake follows the trajectory indicated by (8), body weight will converge to the
steady state, where the choice of food consumption is such that the marginal utility of food is
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equal to the marginal disutility of weight (see equation 13). Note that both the steady state
food consumption and body weight are positive functions of the healthy weight, of the body
weight associated with food satiation and of the ideal body weight.
-
wG
wWi
underweight overweight overweight
wHi w
F
i w
C
i
undereating undereating overeating
Figure 1: Possible steady states for an agent that tends to be overweight
To appreciate the implication of Proposition 1, Figure 1 shows what happens for the case
where sticking to the satiating choice of food consumption would yield the agent to be overweight.
In such a case wWi < w
C
i and three cases can occur. If w
G < wWi ; agent i will be underweight
and undereating; if wG 2  wWi ; wCi  agent i will be overweight and undereating; and if wG > wWi
agent i will be overweight and overeating. Note that the distance between wWi and w
C
i increases
as  decreases. If there were no social pressure ( = 0) only the steady state associated with
being overweight and undereating could arise. If instead the satiating choice yielded to be
underweight, wFi < w
H
i , and  > 0; three possible steady states could arise, namely (i) a
condition of being underweight and undereating, (ii) a condition of being underweight and
overeating, and (iii) a condition of being overweight and overeating. Analogously to the previous
case, when  = 0, only the steady state associated with being underweight and overeating can
be reached. Overall, this means that, depending on the individual characteristics of agent i and
on the ideal body weight, a variety of steady states can arise:
1. overweight and undereating;
2. overweight and overeating;
3. underweight and overeating;
4. underweight and undereating.
All steady states above can be produced within the same theoretical framework and they are
consistent with the empirical observation on the eating behavior of people and the body weight
they reach. The rst category corresponds to those that constrain their food consumption
in order to avoid becoming more overweight (i.e. fat people that stay on a diet). The second
category results when the ideal weight wG is very high, i.e. wG > maxfwCi ; wWi g: Sumo wrestlers
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and body builders tend to reach this condition. The third case is typical of people that have
a very fast metabolism (i.e.  is high) and must compensate for it by overeating. The fourth
category occurs when the ideal weight is very low, i.e. wG < minfwCi ; wWi g: People falling into
this category are thin, and yet they restrain their food consumption.
4 Is increasing the ideal body weight desirable?
All policies mentioned in section 2 observe that the current ideal body weight is below the
average body weight of the population, and that it would be desirable to increase it. In this
section we show that the desirability of increasing the ideal body weight critically depends on
what the new ideal body weight is and on who will be a¤ected by this change. In order to
do so, we rst determine the ideal body weight that maximizes average utility and the ideal
body weight that minimizes average health losses. Then, we use these two theoretical ndings
to evaluate the Spanish and German proposal, according to which the ideal body weight should
resemble the population biometrics.
4.1 Optimal ideal body weight
In the previous section we have considered the optimal behavior of a generic agent i belonging
to group G: We now focus on the whole group, assuming that all its members choose their food
intake according to Proposition 1.
For all agents in G; the ideal body weight is the same. They are however heterogeneous in
their individual healthy weights wHi and in their satiation levels c
F
i :
15 Let fG(wH ; cF ) be the
joint density function of the healthy weights wHi and of the satiation levels c
F
i of the agents
belonging to group G. This allows us to write the average utility of group G asZ Z
Ui;G (ci; wi) fG
 
wH ; cF

dwHdcF : (16)
Dene wH and cF as the average healthy weight and the average satiation level in group
G, respectively. By analogy with the individual case, we dene wF = cF = as the body weight
associated to satiation and we say that the group tends to be overweight if wF > wH ; and that
it tends to be underweight otherwise.
Let C = 1=
n

 
1 + 2

+ [1 +  ( + )]2
o
, then the following Lemma applies:
15All the following statements are made at the group level. This implies that, given that agents are heteroge-
neous, it is possible that policies that are, say, welfare improving at the group level, decrease welfare for some
agent. This does not a¤ect the statements as long as the welfare losses are more than compensated for by the
welfare gains of other agents in the group.
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Lemma 1 Given the joint density function fG(wH ; cF ) of the healthy weights wHi and of the
satiation levels cFi :
1. the ideal body weight that maximizes the average steady state utility of group G is
wG0 = [ 1 +  +  ( + 2 )]CwH + 2
h
1 +  + ( + )2
i
CwF ; (17)
2. the ideal body weight wG0 is between the average healthy weight and the body weight asso-
ciated to satiation wF ;
3. when wG = wG0; on average the group will reach a steady state associated with
(a) undereating and being overweight if wF > wH ; and
(b) overeating and being underweight if wF < wH :
Proof. Consider the following problem
max
wG
Z Z
Ui;G (w

i ; c

i ) fG(w
H ; cF )dwHdcF :
Taking the derivative with respect to wG yieldsZ Z 8<:
h
(1 + )2 + ( + )2
i
A2
cFi +
1 +  +  ( + 2)
A2
wHi +
 
22 +
 
2 + 1

[1 +  +  ( + 2)]
A2
wG
)
fG(w
H ; cF )dwHdcF = 0:
Exploiting the additive separability of the foc, it can be simplied as follows

h
1 +  + ( + )2
i
cF + [1 +  +  ( + 2)]wH+
 2  2 + 1+ [1 +  +  ( + 2)]	wG = 0:
Solving with respect to wG yields the ideal body weight that maximizes the average utility of G:
Substituting wG0 in the steady state food consumption and body weight of the representative
consumer, i.e. an agent whose satiation level and healthy weight is precisely cF and wH ; yields
the last result in the Lemma.
The Lemma above implies that, under the optimal ideal body weight wG = wG0; group G
would not reach a steady state associated with being underweight and undereating, nor with
being overweight and overeating. In other words, these are dominated outcomes that the policy
maker would eliminate if it could optimally set the ideal body weight.
We now consider what ideal body weight would maximize the average steady state health of
group G, which is equivalent to the solution of the following problem
min
wG
Z Z  
wi   wHi
2
fG(w
H ; cF )dwHdcF :
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Lemma 2 Given the joint density function fG(wH ; cF ) of the healthy weights wHi and of the
satiation levels cFi :
1. The ideal body weight that maximizes the average steady state health of group G is
wW = wH    ( + )

 
wF   wH ; (18)
2. the body weight wW is less than the average healthy weight if the group tends towards being
overweight, and it is higher if the group tends towards being underweight;
3. when wG = wW ; on average the steady state will not be associated with being overweight,
nor being underweight. The steady state is characterised by
(a) undereating if wF > wH ; and
(b) overeating if wF < wH :
Proof. See the previous proof, replacing the average utility function with the average loss
function.
4.2 Should the healthy weight be the ideal body weight?
After presenting the individual model and determining the ideal body weights that maximize
the average utility and health of a target group G; we can now focus on the case that is the
major source of concern for the governments that have promoted actions against the "slimming
mania". It has been suggested that a suitable ideal body weight should be the healthy weight.
We now show how such an intervention would a¤ect the eating behavior of the target group,
and we assess whether it is welfare and health improving.
More specically, we restrict our attention to women, and consider the case where there is a
tendency towards being overweight and where the ideal body weight the target group refers to is
lower than its average healthy weight, i.e. the case where wF > wH > wG. The former condition
seems to be consistent with the evidence that, in Western industrialized countries, obesity is
increasing (Acs and Zoltan, 2007, among others). The latter is supported by the evidence that
the majority of women are exposed to an ideal weight lower than their healthy body weight16.
From Fig. 1 one can see that the scenario under examination induces people to restrain
average food consumption. Concerning the body weight that is reached in steady state, two
cases can occur. If the ideal body weight is very low, i.e. wW > wG; the agents will be on
average underweight, otherwise (if wH > wG > wW ) the agents will be on average overweight.
According to Proposition 1, it is easy to observe that, when the ideal body weight is wH ; the
(new) steady state is characterized by being overweight and undereating. This means that the
16Fashion models and celebrities are thinner than 98% of American women (Smolak, 1996).
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steady state characterized by underweight and undereating could not emerge if the ideal body
weight were the average body weight of the target group. The following Propositions state what
are the welfare and health consequences of increasing the ideal body weight up to the average
healthy weight of the target group.
Proposition 2 When the target group tends towards being overweight, increasing the current
ideal body weight to the average healthy weight is welfare improving.
Proof. When the optimal ideal weight wG0 is higher than the current ideal weight, increasing
the latter (eventually until wG0) is welfare improving. According to Lemma 1, when wF > wH ;
then wF > wG0 > wH ; i.e. the optimal body weight is higher than the average healthy weight.
The current ideal weight wG is, instead, lower than wH : Accordingly, increasing the ideal body
weight up to the average healthy weight increases the average utility of the target group.
The Proposition shows that the above mentioned policies are well-founded and that aiming
at an ideal body weight that resembles the average healthy weight of the target group increases
the average utility of the group. One might wonder whether this policy also improves its health
condition. The following Proposition addresses this issue.
Proposition 3 When the target group tends towards being overweight, increasing the current
ideal body weight to the average healthy weight is health improving if the current ideal body weight
is very low.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, when wF > wH ; then wW is lower than wH : If wG is lower
than wW (which leads the group to be underweight), increasing the ideal body weight is health
increasing until wW . Let ~wG = wH   2(+)
 
wF   wH be the threshold ideal weight that
induces the target group to have a health condition identical to the one that would be reached
when wH = wG: If wG < ~wG; which means that the current ideal weight is very low, setting
wH = wG is strictly health improving; if ~wG < wG < wH it is strictly health worsening.
The above Proposition shows that increasing the ideal body weight up to the average healthy
weight critically depends on the current ideal body weight. Accordingly, if the current ideal body
weight is very low, an ideal body weight equal to the average body weight is unambiguously
health improving. The current trend for "size zero" and the rising popularity of visibly un-
derweight models and celebrities suggest that this might indeed be the relevant case (Ahern et
al., 2008). If the current ideal weight were not so low, instead, increasing it up to the average
healthy weight of the group would not improve the health condition. This might occur for two
reasons. If wG > wW ; the target group is already overweight and it would become even more
overweight. If instead ~wG < wG < wW , the group passes from being underweight to becoming
overweight. This condition is not health improving because in the original scenario the group
would be closer to the healthy weight than under the new scenario. It is however important to
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stress that, even if the average health condition worsens, this is compensated for by the increased
utility from food consumption and the reduced social pressure (Proposition 3). Increasing the
body weight from wG to wH is therefore unambiguously welfare improving and desirable for the
policy maker whenever the current ideal body weight is lower than the average healthy weight
of the target group.
5 Conclusions
Inspired by the policies implemented by some European government to counteract unhealthy
eating behavior, the present paper shows how policy actions that modify the ideal body weight
a¤ect individual eating choices and body weight. We have proposed a model where the utility
of a forward-looking agent depends on (i) food consumption, (ii) the health condition, and (iii)
the conformity of body weight to an ideal weight. The agent is aware of how food consumption
a¤ects body weight, and she explicitly takes this information into account when choosing how
much to eat. We have shown that both a condition of being overweight and a condition of being
underweight can result, and that it can be optimal to be on a diet despite being underweight, or to
binge despite being overweight. These outcomes, which are often described in the psychological
literature as forms of unhealthy eating, result from a rational intertemporal maximizing process
of a perfectly informed agent, and are not due to bounded rationality, lack of information or
self-control, or desire for self-destruction.
The model we propose can be used for evaluating the policies mentioned. Focusing on the
specic proposal contained in the agreements, we study the consequences of having the healthy
weight as the ideal body weight. We show that, given the current tendency towards obesity and
the existence of thin ideal weights, such a policy is welfare improving, but it might have adverse
e¤ects on health if it induces people to become too overweight.
The model is a starting point for studying eating behavior under social pressure. Interesting
extensions include introducing the role of peers in the denition of the ideal body weight, and
allowing agents to choose their ideal body weight among multiple available ideal weights. Due
to the novelty of the policies considered (the rst agreement was signed in 2006), an empirical
assessment does not exist. Collecting data and running a program to monitor the e¤ects of these
policies would then be a challenging development of this work. This is left for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Physical e¤ort as an additional choice variable
Consider the case where the agent can choose both the amount of food consumption ci and the
amount of physical e¤ort ei  0. We now show that, under this set up, the optimal solutions and
steady state share the same properties illustrated in Section 3. Let the individual utility function
Ui;G (ci; wi; ei) be additively separable and strictly concave with respect to all its arguments. To
account for the fact that exerting physical e¤ort burns calories, we consider the following law of
motion for body weight
_wi(t) = ci(t)  wi(t)  "ei(t) (19)
with "  0: The current-value Hamiltonian is (omitting the arguments and the time index to
simplify the notation)
H() = U (c; w; e) +m(c  w   "e); (20)
with m being the relevant costate. The necessary conditions for an internal solution are
Hc () = Uc () +m = 0 (21)
He () = Ue () m" = 0 (22)
_m = (+ )m  Uw (23)
_w = c  w   "e (24)
The additional insight with respect to the basic model concerns the optimal choice of physical
e¤ort e: From (21) and (22) one obtains the following optimality condition:
Uc ()
Ue () =  
1
"
: (25)
The above equation means that, irrespective of the shadow value of weight m; the optimal
choice of consumption and e¤ort depends on the marginal rate of substitution between food
consumption and physical exercise. As " is non negative, both along the transition path and in
steady state it is optimal to choose c and e so that the marginal utility of food consumption and
the marginal utility of physical exercise have di¤erent signs. As an example, consider the case
where the utility from physical e¤ort is ei  e2i =2; with ;   0: The rst term represents the
benet of physical exercise and the second term its disutility cost. Then the necessary conditions
are
c  cF = m (26)
  e = "m (27)
_m = (+ )m+ ( + 1)w   wH   wG (28)
_w = c  w   "e (29)
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which implies the following linear relation between optimal consumption and e¤ort
e =


+
"

 
cF   c (30)
The above equation has two implications. First, food consumption and physical e¤ort are
substitutes, which implies that, with respect to the benchmark model, the agent can eat more,
everything else equal, if she exerts more e¤ort. Second, we can solve the problem by focusing on
body weight and consumption only, as information on the optimal e¤ort can be simply derived
by (30). Di¤erentiating with respect to time (26), substituting the value of e from (27) and the
value of m from (26), the dynamics of food consumption is equivalent to (13), which implies the
same asymptotic stability of the benchmark model. Let F = (1 + ) "2 +  [1 +  +  ( + )] ;
then the steady state is
c =
1
F

" (1 + ) +

(1 + ) "2 +  ( + )

cF + 
 
wG + wH
	
e =
1
F

 [1 +  +  ( + )] + "

(1 + ) cF     wG + wH	
w =
1
F
 
cF   " ( + ) +  "2 +   wG + wG :
It can be shown that, as in the benchmark model, both an overweight and an underweight steady
state can emerge.
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